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ARE NETWORK EFFECTS REALLY ALL ABOUT SIZE?
THE ROLE OF STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT
ALLAN AFUAH*
Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
U.S.A.
Rooted in neoclassical economics, network effects research has revolved around size, arguing
that the more users a network has, the more valuable that network will be to each user. I argue
that a network’s structure (feasibility of transactions, centrality of members, structural holes,
network ties, the number of roles each member plays) and its conduct (opportunistic behavior,
reputation signaling, perceptions of trust) also have significant impacts on a network’s value
to users and to network providers. Network research that neglects structure and conduct and
focuses only on size can lead to wrong strategies or a misleading research agenda. Copyright 
2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
The performance of firms in many industries—
from banking to telecommunications to social net-
works—depends on their offering of products that
exhibit network effects. A product exhibits net-
work effects if its value to users depends not only
on benefits from the product itself but also on
access to the network of people using that prod-
uct or a compatible one (Katz and Shapiro, 1985,
1992; Farrell and Saloner, 1986; Liebowitz and
Margolis, 1994; Economides, 1996; Sheremata,
2004). For example, the value that an e-mail user
derives from his/her e-mail software depends not
only on the ease of use and other benefits of the
software but also on the network of people with
whom he/she can communicate using e-mail.
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To the extent that users derive value from being
members of a network, an important question is,
what is it about a network that bestows value on
network members? Early research exploring the
phenomenon of network effects has been grounded
largely in neoclassical economics and, in answer-
ing this question, has focused primarily on the
role of network size. Witness the following three
definitions from frequently cited network effects
papers:
1. ‘The benefit that a consumer derives from the
use of a good often depends on the number of
other consumers purchasing compatible items,’
Katz and Shapiro, (1986: 822).
2. ‘A good is often more valuable to any user, the
more others use compatible goods,’ Farrell and
Saloner, (1986: 940); and
3. ‘A network externality exists when the value
of consuming a particular product or service
increases in the number of consumers that
use compatible products or services,’ Gandal,
(1994: 160; 1995: 599).
Copyright  2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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This emphasis on size has been extended to the
normative advice for managers whose firms com-
pete in network markets (Benson and Farrell, 1994;
Shapiro and Varian, 1999). For example, firms
have been urged to exploit direct network effects
by building an early lead in network size and pric-
ing strategically, or to take advantage of indirect
network effects by, for example, boosting com-
plements early in the life of a product that needs
complements (Benson and Farrell, 1994; Schilling,
2002; Shapiro and Varian, 1999).
This paper builds on recent research that treats
a network as more than a black box whose size is
important (Swann, 2002; Dellarocas, 2003; Suarez,
2005; Soh, 2010) and argues that two factors influ-
ence the value a network member or provider can
derive from network effects: network structure (of
which size is only one component), and network
conduct. In particular, I argue that the value each
network member and network provider derives
from a network will be influenced by (a) the feasi-
bility of transactions, (b) the centrality of its mem-
bers, (c) the structural holes and ties within the
network, (d) the number of roles each member can
play, as well as by (e) the level of opportunistic
behavior, (f) the members’ reputation, and (g) the
perceptions of trust. I also argue that a strategy
for attaining dominance in a network market that
is rooted only in network size, without explicitly
exploring these components of structure and con-
duct, is likely to overlook important sources of
competitive advantage. The propositions of this
paper suggest that focusing on size alone can be
misleading to both researchers and managers.
Why is it important to research the value that
network users and providers can derive from a
network?1 And why is there a need to explore
beyond network size? First, products and services
that exhibit network effects cut across all kinds
of industries from health care (health maintenance
organizations [HMOs]) to financial services, to
high tech (computers and communications). Some
of these industries, such as online social networks,
have increasingly complex networks and business
models that management scholars and practicing
managers alike are struggling to understand. We
need good theory to help us understand what is
1 A network provider is a firm that provides a core component
or subsystem of the infrastructure of a network that enables
network members to stay connected and to undertake network
transactions. Network providers are usually members of the
network.
going on in network industries. Besides, to the
extent that ‘there is nothing so practical as a
good theory’ (Lewin, 1951: 169), theory-grounded
research about network effects could help man-
agers make better decisions in a world in which,
increasingly, some of the most complex products
and services exhibit network effects.
Second, over the past decade, social network
theory (SNT) has been emerging as a theoreti-
cal perspective for exploring strategy questions.
An important part of that evolution is linking firm
performance to social network constructs such as
structural holes, network ties, and network central-
ity. This paper links social network constructs to
network-related value creation and capture, and to
competitive advantage. In doing so, it potentially
contributes to clarifying the elusive but important
connection between SNT and firm performance.
Third, network effects are strategic resources
(Shankar and Bayus, 2003). Studying how net-
work members or providers derive value from
networks can help us identify where strategic
resources originate and how they translate into
economic rents—important research questions that
have received little attention despite the tremen-
dous amount of research about the resource-based
view of the firm (RBV) (e.g., Helfat and Peteraf,
2003; McEvily and Chakravarthy, 2001). To the
extent that network structure and conduct also con-
tribute to value creation and capture, understanding
that contribution explicates the linkage between
product-market position (PMP) and resources/
capabilities.
Fourth, treating network size as the sole deter-
minant of a network’s value to users is tantamount
to omitting variables, which biases estimates and
makes research results difficult to interpret. It can
also be misleading to managers.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The protagonist in this paper is a firm that is a
network member or provider, and whose goal is
to have a competitive advantage in the markets
in which it competes. (The protagonist could also
be a consumer/member of the network whose goal
is to satisfy its consumption needs.) The network
can, depending on its properties, contribute to
the firm’s competitive advantage (or to satisfying
the consumer’s needs). Before exploring why and
how the structure and conduct of a network can
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make such a contribution, it is insightful to define
competitive advantage and explain what is meant
by a network being ‘valuable’ and a network
‘provider.’
A firm has a competitive advantage when it
earns a higher-than-average rate of profitability in
the markets in which it competes (Grant, 2005;
Besanko et al., 2010). To have a competitive
advantage, a firm often must create and/or cap-
ture value better than its competitors (Afuah, 2002,
2009; Besanko et al., 2010). A firm creates value
when the benefits it offers to customers exceed the
cost of offering those benefits. It captures value
when the price it obtains for the benefits exceeds
the cost of offering them. (End-consumers can also
capture value in the form of consumer surplus
when the benefits they receive from a network are
greater than the price they pay for the benefits.)
Thus, a network contributes to a firm’s compet-
itive advantage when it enhances value creation
and/or capture. I will refer to a network as being
‘valuable’ to a firm—whether the firm is a net-
work provider or a network member—when the
network contributes to the firm’s value creation
and/or capture, and therefore to the firm’s compet-
itive advantage. It is valuable to a consumer when
it contributes to satisfying the consumer’s needs.
The other important term that needs more clari-
fication is ‘network provider.’ A network provider
supplies a core component or subsystem of the
infrastructure needed for network members to
stay connected and undertake network transac-
tions. Depending on the type of network, network
providers have also been called network spon-
sors, network owners, platform sponsors or own-
ers, and network suppliers (e.g., Rochet and Tirole,
2003). Good examples of network providers are
eBay, with a network of registered users who buy
and sell using the infrastructure the firm provides;
Facebook, with a social network that thrives in
the infrastructure it built; cell phone companies,
with their networks of subscribers and associ-
ated infrastructures; credit card companies, such as
Visa, with networks of cardholders and merchants;
Toyota’s supplier networks (Dyer and Nobeoka,
2000); and computer networks (such as Wintel)
in which Microsoft and Intel are major providers
since the former supplies core software and the
latter offers the microprocessor architecture. Of
course, there are networks that have no ‘providers.’
These include informal networks whose infrastruc-
ture is largely virtual, such as those for know-how
trading described by Schrader (1991). Such net-
works are valuable largely to their members.
THE ORIGINS OF SIZE’S DOMINANCE
Now consider a network in which the following
four neoclassical economics assumptions that are
implied or explicitly stated in past network effects
literature (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Farrell and
Saloner, 1986; Gandal, 1994) hold:
1. Every member of the network can transact with
every other member and benefit equally from
transacting with each member (Assumption 1 ).
2. There is resource/capabilities homogeneity
across network members and across network
providers (Assumption 2 ).
3. All network members are rational and have
identical information about each other and about
all possible transactions within the network
(Assumption 3 ).
4. Information flows seamlessly from member to
member (Assumption 4 ).
If such a network has N members, the first member
can undertake transactions with the remaining N–1
members. If all N members can transact with each
other, there are N(N–1) possible connections in
the network. And since each connection gives
members an opportunity to create and/or capture
value or satisfy a need, the value of the network
is proportional to the N(N–1) connections. The
connections that take place in such a network with
N=4 and N=8 are shown in Figure 1, where the
connection from, say, A to B is counted separately
from the connection from B to A (so-called two-
way network).
Now consider a rational new consumer who
wants to join a network. If the consumer joins
the N=4 network, the number of connections in
that network rises from 4(4–1)=12 to 5(5–1)=20.
In other words, the value that consumer’s mem-
bership adds is 8 (proportional to 8) because the
consumer’s decision to join increased the num-
ber of connections by 8. If the consumer joins the
N=8 network, the number of possible connections
changes from 8(8–1)=56 to 9(9–1)=72, for an
added value that is 16 (proportional to 16). There-
fore, with each additional network member, the
provider of an N=8 network gets more ‘new’ value
than the provider of an N=4 network. In general,












Figure 1. Size determines value
as N grows very large, the number of possible con-
nections N(N–1)=N2 –N approaches N2 and the
value of the network rises proportionately.2 Thus,
when Assumptions 1–4 hold, the expected value
to each network user and provider from network
effects increases with the square of network size.
I will refer to this result as the size hypothesis.
Critical size and normative advice
When a rational customer wants to buy a product
that exhibits network effects, he or she considers
not only the benefits from the product but also the
value bestowed by the network. Put differently, a
customer will choose to join a product’s network
not only because of the expected value from net-
work effects but also because of the benefits from
the product itself. Early in the life of a product and
its network, the network’s size, N, is very small
and the expected value, which is proportional to
N2 –N, is also very small. Thus, in this early stage,
the dominant influencer of a customer’s choice
of network is likely to be the benefits from the
product. However, as N increases, N2 –N increases
rapidly. Beyond some size, Nc (the critical size),
the value from network effects dominates since it is
proportional to N2 –N. This dominance continues
until some agent, such as a technological innova-
tion, renders the network obsolete or enables net-
work providers to improve product benefits enough
to overcome the network size advantage.
One implication of the size hypothesis is that,
beyond the critical size, Nc, a lead in network
2 Among other things, size lowers coordination costs, raises
switching costs, and increases barriers to entry, thereby poten-
tially contributing to both value creation and capture (Besanko
et al., 2010).
size—even a very small lead—can grow exponen-
tially, enabling the network provider(s) to dominate
the market or win a standard, relegating competi-
tors to niche markets or oblivion (Arthur, 1989;
David, 1985). Not surprisingly, a great deal of
the normative advice offered to firms in network
industries has been rooted in the size hypothesis.
For example, it has been suggested that early in
the life of a network (before it reaches its crit-
ical network size), network providers are better
off pursuing actions that would give their products
an early lead in network size (Bensen and Far-
rell, 1994). They might, for example, team up with
competitors to flood the market with one version
of the product, or entice new network members
with free or low-priced products (e.g., Shapiro and
Varian, 1999; Khazam and Mowery, 1994). Other
researchers have argued that investment in contin-
uous learning and innovation can enable a firm to
build a stock of related knowledge and routines
to locate, evaluate, and assimilate new knowledge
(Sheremata, 2004; Zahra and George, 2002). This
stock of knowledge can enable a firm to offer
products with customer benefits that are superior
enough to overcome a competitor’s network size
advantage (Schilling, 2002; Sheremata, 2004).
Beyond network size: the importance of
network structure and conduct for strategy
Assumptions 1–4 enabled me to derive the size
hypothesis and make predictions about the impor-
tance of network size in some industries. However,
simplifying assumptions can strip off important
insights, especially information for making nor-
mative prescriptions. Clearly, the four assumptions
do not reflect the circumstances in most network
industries and may be depriving researchers of
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Figure 2. Structure also determines value
paths to important constructs and solutions to
interesting questions. In what follows, I relax the
assumptions in search of other network insights,
beyond the size hypothesis, that are potential
sources of competitive advantage. I group these
characteristics by network structure and network
conduct.
STRUCTURE
A network’s structure is the number of mem-
bers, the relationships among them, and the het-
erogeneity and relative characteristics of members
and their relationships (Tirole, 1988; Burt 2001;
Besanko et al., 2010). In this construct, network
size becomes one of several important factors.
Below, I inductively derive the other factors by
relaxing Assumptions 1–4, and show how they
too, like size, might contribute to competitive
advantages for network users and providers.
Transaction feasibility
In a phone network, where the primary transaction
is making or receiving calls, anyone with a net-
work phone number can call any other person with
a network phone number. Therefore Assumption 1
holds: ‘Every member of the network can trans-
act with every other member of the network.’
Assumption 1 does not hold in a credit card net-
work, however, because cardholders can transact
with merchants but not with other cardholders. Nor
does it hold for a social network such as Facebook
where groups of members control who can join a
conversation. In fact, Assumption 1 does not hold
for many networks, and therefore their structures
are anything but that in Figure 1. To see why, con-
sider the four structures of Figure 2. All of them
have eight members. However, in Figures 2b, 2c,
and 2d, not all members can transact with each
other. Figure 2b is an example of a two-sided net-
work, in which there are two distinct groups that
provide benefits to the other (Rochet and Tirole,
2003; Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005). The more
members that participate in Side 1, the more valu-
able the network is for members of Side 2, and
vice versa. When a new member joins Side 1, the
increase in the value of the network is proportional
to 8, but only for Side 2 members and the network
provider. A credit card network is an example of
a two-sided network because it has two groups
of members: cardholders and merchants. Whether
network members gain value from an additional
member depends on (a) which side the new mem-
ber joins and (b) where the focal members reside.
Copyright  2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 34: 257–273 (2013)
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Figure 2c is an example of three subnetworks
within a larger network, such as a social network
(e.g., Facebook) in which people of the same
persuasion gravitate toward their own group. The
value added when a member joins one of the
subnetworks in Figure 2c is proportional to 6 if the
new member joins the two-member subnetwork,
and proportional to 8 if the new member joins one
of the two three-member subnetworks.
All three networks in Figure 2 have 8 members
each. However, the network in Figure 2a, in which
each member can transact with all other members,
is the most valuable to each member and to the
network provider(s), followed by the network of
Figure 2b, and then that of 2d. The network in
Figure 2c is the least valuable. Effectively, despite
the fact that all four networks have the same size,
the value they create varies with their structures.
Proposition 1a: The more that each network
member can transact with every other member,
the more valuable the network is likely to be to
each member and to the network provider(s).
Centrality and structural holes
To the extent that not every network member can
transact with every other member, each member’s
position in the network is likely to be different,
and therefore should have a different impact on
how much value the member adds to or captures
from the network. To see how, consider Figure 2d.
L can transact with more members than anyone
else. If L decides not to transact with J or K,
it can still transact with I, M, or N. J and K
have fewer choices than L. Because it is more
centrally located than other members, L is said
to have a high degree of centrality (Sparrowe
et al., 2001). The addition of a centrally located
actor such as L adds more incremental value to a
network than the addition of a less centrally located
member such as J or M. More importantly, a
centrally located member can create and/or capture
more value from the network than a less centrally
located one (Paruchuri, 2010; Soh, 2010; Sparrowe
et al, 2001). As we will see later, if a centrally
located member is opportunistic, the impact on
other members and the network provider(s) can
be negative.
Proposition 1b: The more central a non-oppor-
tunistic member’s position in a network, the
more valuable the member is likely to be to other
network members and the network provider(s).
In Figure 2d, L also has another important posi-
tion: it is the only member that bridges the struc-
tural hole between subnetworks IJKM and NPO
(Burt, 1992, 2000, 2001). By providing a nonre-
dundant link between the two subnetworks, L adds
value not only to its own IJKM subnetwork, but
also to the NPO subnetwork and to the overall
network. N plays a similar role for its own NPO
subnetwork. A member that bridges a structural
hole brings more value to the network than one
that does not (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; Burt,
2000; Pollock, Porac, and Wade, 2004; Fleming
and Waguespack, 2007). If the bridge that it makes
between the two subnetworks is nonredundant, the
member is a monopoly as far as the bridge is con-
cerned, and therefore has bargaining power during
some transactions between the two subnetworks.
How much value the member can create or cap-
ture depends on the type of network and the cir-
cumstances. For example, an investment bank that
bridges the hole between start-ups that want to go
public and private investors can capture a lot more
value than engineers who bridge the hole between
their firm and the subnet-network of outside engi-
neers and scientists during know-how trading (Pol-
lock et al., 2004; Schrader, 1991).
Proposition 1c: Members that bridge structural
holes in a network are more likely to create
and/or capture more value than members that
do not.
While the effect of a member being centrally
located in a network, or of bridging a structural
hole, is usually positive for that member, the effect
on a network provider is not as straightforward.
Because a new centrally located member of a
network, or one that bridges structural holes, adds
more value than a less strategically located one
(Burt, 2001), their addition can be good for the
network provider. However, if these strategically
located members are opportunistic, their presence
can attract other opportunistic types and/or drive
non-opportunistic types, thereby reducing value
creation and capture (Akerlof, 1970).
Network ties
According to Assumption 4, information flows
seamlessly through a network. That may not be
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true for some networks. For example, during inno-
vation, an actor may want to move large amounts
of information, some of it tacit. Tacit information
can be difficult and costly to transfer (von Hippel,
1994). Hansen (1999) found that the transfer of
knowledge through a network is a function of the
type of knowledge being transferred and the type
of ties the transfer uses. Tacit knowledge is best
transferred through strong ties (frequent and close
relations) while explicit knowledge (such as infor-
mation about where to find complex knowledge) is
best transferred through weak ties (infrequent and
distant relations). For example, in online auctions,
determining the value of an antique or a work of
art can involve tacit and complex knowledge. A
buyer may need to see, feel, and touch the object.
The buyer may also need to talk to experts. What’s
more, the buyer may need to evaluate the seller and
the seller’s information about the object to estab-
lish authenticity, and so on. The frequent and close
relationships of strong ties enable a firm to build
a reputation or trust, both of which reduce trans-
action uncertainty about partners. Strong ties also
allow a firm to gain experience in interacting with
the partner, thereby reducing uncertainty. Some
evidence of this is provided by Suarez (2005), who
found that in making their decisions about which
technology to adopt, cellular phone operators paid
more attention to the decisions made by other oper-
ators in countries with which the operators had
strong ties.
If the item to be exchanged is a new experience
good—a new product or service whose quality is
difficult to ascertain before use—two options are
available to the seller to help the buyer establish
the good’s quality: (1) advertising, pricing, and
branding to signal the quality of the good (Nelson,
1970; Milgrom and Roberts 1986), and (2) letting
the buyer use the good to determine its value
before paying for it. Advertising, pricing, and
branding information has both explicit and tacit
components, and therefore requires both strong
and weak ties for effective transmission within a
network. Thus, if the seller decides to signal the
quality of an experience good within a network, its
effectiveness in doing so will depend on the related
strong and weak ties in the network. If the seller
decides to let the buyer evaluate the good before
purchase, it runs the risk that once the buyer uses
the good the buyer may not have the incentive
to pay for it (Arrow, 1962). Strong ties between
buyer and seller will (a) allow the seller to, for
example, build a reputation for retaliation that will
scare buyers into having an incentive to pay for the
good; (b) allow buyer and seller to build enough
trust between them to discourage the buyer from
behaving opportunistically; or (c) allow the buyer
to build a reputation for being a bad transaction
partner, thereby enabling the seller to find another
buyer.
Clearly, both weak and strong ties are impor-
tant drivers of the value users derive from their
networks: weak ties for locating what needs to be
exchanged and strong ties for making exchanges
(Hansen, 1999; Granovetter, 1985). Thus, a focus
on network size alone, without attention to the
number and nature of ties within the network, can
be misleading. A large network without such ties
is likely to be less valuable to members and to the
network provider than a smaller one that has them.
Proposition 2: The more that the ratio of strong-
to-weak ties matches the ratio of tacit-to-explicit
knowledge, the more valuable the network is
likely to be for members and the network
provider(s).
Roles played by each network member
The number and distribution of roles played by
each actor in a network also influences the net-
work’s value. To see how, consider the net-
work structures in Figure 3. Each structure has
six actors. To keep the discussion tractable, let’s
assume that Role1 players are sellers while Role2
players are buyers. In the structure in Figure 3a,
each of the six actors is simultaneously a buyer
and a seller, and can sell to or buy from five oth-
ers. Since each of the N members can undertake
2(N–1) transactions, the total number of possible
transactions is 2N(N–1)=60. In the structure in
Figure 3b, each member can sell or buy, but not
both. Among the six members there is one seller
and five buyers. The one seller can sell to five
of the six members but each buyer can buy only
from the one seller, making the total number of
transactions N–1=5. Clearly, the second structure
is not as valuable to buyers as the first one even
though both structures have the same network size
(six members).
In Figure 3c, where there are three buyers and
three sellers, each seller can sell to three buy-
ers and each buyer can buy from three sellers,
for a total of (Nb)(Ns)=9. Electronic commerce



















Figure 3. The role played by each actor in a network impacts potential value creation and capture
networks provide some examples. The structure
of Figure 3a is similar to eBay’s initial network
of registered users who traded in personal col-
lectibles. Each of these members was both a poten-
tial seller and a potential buyer. The structure of
Figure 3b is more similar to Amazon.com’s net-
work before competitors moved in, when Amazon
was the only seller in its network. Clearly, eBay’s
network was more valuable to each of its cus-
tomers who wanted an antique (and to eBay) than
Amazon.com’s was to each of its customers who
wanted a book. Both companies’ networks have
since evolved into more complex structures.
Proposition 3: The more critical roles that each
network member plays, the more valuable, on
average, the network is likely to be to each
member and to the network provider(s).
Heterogeneity of capabilities and the inverted
U-shape of size
Contrary to Assumption 2, capabilities are usu-
ally not homogeneous across network members or
network providers (Peteraf, 1993; Mahoney and
Pandian 1992). Consequently, different members
and providers of a network are likely to have dif-
ferent abilities to add or capture value from it.
For example, an international telephone network
is more valuable to a person who is capable of
speaking many languages than it is to a person who
speaks only one. If a firm wants to successfully
engage in know-how trading of the type described
by Schrader (1991), it needs the absorptive capac-
ity to evaluate, value, and assimilate know-how
from partners, as well as the know-how it can use
for exchange. Members who make nonredundant
bridges to structural holes are likely to have some
distinctive capabilities. For example, in investment
banking, a bank with the right client relationships
is in a better position to bridge structural holes
between segments of clients than one that does
not have such prized relationships (Pollock et al.,
2004). In innovation, gatekeepers must have the
ability to translate internal communications codes
into what the outside world can understand and
vice versa so as to be able to bridge structural
holes between their internal company networks
and external ones (Allen, 1984). And a network
member who has valuable difficult-to-imitate capa-
bilities is likely to have more bargaining power
over fellow network members than one without
such capabilities. It will therefore be in a better
position to appropriate more of the value created
in the network than other members.
Proposition 4a: A network is likely to be more
valuable to members and providers that possess
distinctive value-appropriating capabilities than
to those that do not posses such capabilities.
If valuable capabilities are scarce, difficult-to-
imitate, and nontradable, a network member or
provider with such capabilities can profit from
them as the network grows and value increases as
a function of N2 –N, provided the capabilities are
scalable. However, if scalability of capabilities is
limited—for example, because they are difficult to
replicate—such a firm may be unable to obtain the
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additional capabilities it needs to manage exponen-
tial growth. After a certain network size, each new
member is likely to have a negative effect on net-
work value. (For example, a congested telephone
network may start dropping calls.) Thus, when a
network that requires scarce difficult-to-replicate
resources reaches some size, the addition of new
members may actually reduce the value each mem-
ber derives from network growth.
Proposition 4b: The lower the scalability of a
firm’s resources for creating and/or capturing
value in a network, the more that a plot of
network value to the firm versus network size
is likely to have an inverted U-shape.
CONDUCT WITHIN A NETWORK
Beyond the structure of a network, the conduct
of its members also has an impact on value. I
will explore the conduct factors by focusing on
Assumption 3. In particular, I explore the effect
of opportunistic behavior and remedies such as
reputation and trust on the network value.
Opportunistic behavior
Opportunistic behavior here refers to self-interest
with guile, and ‘incomplete or distorted disclosure
of information, especially to calculated efforts to
mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise
confuse’ (Williamson, 1985: 47). In a world of
Assumption 3, there is no information asymmetry
and network members are rational. In such a world,
it is difficult for a network member to behave
opportunistically during transactions (Williamson,
1985, 2002). However, in the real world, network
members are boundedly rational and unlikely to
know, or to be able to obtain, all of the informa-
tion they need for many transactions. The result is
information asymmetry, which creates an opening
for opportunistic behavior. For example, a seller
of collectibles may decide to conceal information
not only about him or herself but also about the
collectible. Those network members that bridge
structural holes or are centrally located in a net-
work may also decide to use the power their posi-
tion creates opportunistically for self-gain rather
than for the interest of the network (Sparrowe
et al., 2001). Thus, each additional opportunistic
member may make the network less valuable to
other members and network provider(s). At the
extreme, a network could suffer from a lemons
problem in which high quality members exit the
network, leaving behind only low quality ones
(Akerlof, 1970). The result can be a network that
contributes little or no value to each member’s or
provider’s value creation and/or capture.
However, some researchers have argued that
network members that are opportunistic in some
activities may be good for the network provider(s).
For example, Conner and Rumelt (1991) argued
that some level of software piracy can be good
for suppliers of software and PCs. Their rationale
was that since the marginal cost of ‘supplying’
that extra stolen unit is zero, and users who steal
software build switching costs by learning how to
use it, these users may buy more compelling ver-
sions of the software later. In learning how to use
the software, pirates can also ascertain the value
of the software, improving their chances of pay-
ing for more protected versions. Besides, a larger
network of users can attract new paying mem-
bers, especially businesses. This piracy model is
an exception rather than the rule. The pirates are
opportunistic only when dealing with the software
supplier and not when transacting with other mem-
bers of the network. Thus, on average, opportunis-
tic behavior has a negative effect on value creation
and capture.
Proposition 5: The more opportunistic behavior
there is in a network, the less valuable, on aver-
age, the network is likely to be to members and
the network provider(s).
Reputation effects
Network members can develop a reputation for
retaliation, honesty, trustworthiness, and depend-
ability (e.g., Agarwal, Ganco, and Ziedonis, 2009;
Arend, 2009; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Ring
and Van de Ven, 1992). Members that want to
develop such a reputation will be deterred from
engaging in short-term opportunistic behavior by
the fear of ruining their reputation and foregoing
gains from future transactions. At the same time,
a network member’s reputation serves as a signal
to other members that it is a worthwhile partner
in the relevant transaction. A member with a rep-
utation for retaliation sends a signal to potential
transaction partners that it will retaliate against
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any partner that engages in opportunistic behav-
ior. Similarly, when network members gravitate
to partners with good reputations, less reputable
members may be forced to clean up their acts or
leave a network.
The economics literature that has explored the
impact of reputation on networks sees opportunism
as being driven by adverse selection and moral
hazard, and the reputation mechanisms put in place
to deter them as depending on which of these
effects the mechanism is targeting (e.g., Dellaro-
cas, 2003; Li, 2010). Recall that in adverse selec-
tion, some members of a network have information
about their type—opportunistic—that other mem-
bers do not have. Thus, reputation mechanisms
can help network members know more about each
member’s type. The activities of the online auction
company eBay offer a good example of how a firm
can help build and communicate reputation effects
and curb the effects of adverse selection. Buyers
and sellers who engage in transactions on eBay
are able to post compliments, criticisms, and other
comments in the eBay Feedback Forum. eBay uses
this information and members’ transaction records
to compile buyer profiles and add color-coded
symbols for potential trading partners to see. Such
ratings give network members some information
about the opportunistic potential of each candidate.
In moral hazard, transacting network members
have the same information—there is informa-
tion symmetry—when they enter a contract but,
after the contract, one party takes an opportunis-
tic action that the other party cannot observe. In
these cases, reputation mechanisms are designed
to encourage more honest behavior by threaten-
ing actors with future punishment. eBay’s ratings
are a good example of reputation mechanisms,
too. The fear of poor ratings and a loss of future
business discourage sellers and buyers from reneg-
ing on terms they agreed to when contracting a
sale.
Proposition 6a: The higher the reputation of
network members for retaliation, honesty, trust-
worthiness, and dependability, the larger is the
impact of network size on network value to its
members and to the network provider(s).
Effect of trust
Chiles and McMackin (1996: 85) defined trust
as ‘the expectation that an exchange partner will
not engage in opportunistic behavior, even in
the face of countervailing short-term incentives. . .
and uncertainty about long-term benefits.’ A net-
work member would undertake a transaction with
a partner if the member trusts either the part-
ner or the object of exchange. (When you buy
a car, you can trust the person selling you the
car or you can trust the car itself.) Thus, the
fear of opportunism in a network can be reduced
when trust is built into the objects of exchange.
Trust can be built into products, know-how, or
other objects of exchange by having reputable
experts authenticate them. Experts have (or can
find) some of the information that an opportunis-
tic partner would hide about its products. By
using such experts, a network can reduce the
amount of information asymmetry on the objects
of exchange. For example, to decrease informa-
tion asymmetry and fraud in its community of
registered users, eBay gets experts to authenti-
cate specialty items such as sports autographs,
original paintings, and other collectibles offered
for its online auction. It also offers warranty ser-
vices, online dispute resolution, and seller identity
verification.
Trust can also be built into transacting part-
ners (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone, 1998; Lado,
Dant, and Tekleab, 2008). According to Granovet-
ter (1985) and Uzzi (1997), personal relationships
can generate trust and discourage opportunism. For
example, in an attempt to create a sense of com-
munity, eBay encourages online interaction among
its registered buyers and sellers by hosting discus-
sion boards, chat rooms, a newsletter, user home
pages, and a ‘giving board’ for charitable dona-
tions to user-identified causes. Transacting part-
ners who believe they will engage in transactions
again are less likely to be opportunistic in the
short term if doing so reduces their opportuni-
ties for profitable future transactions (Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1992). Fear of opportunism can also
be reduced by limiting the damage to transact-
ing parties in the event there is an incidence of
opportunism. For example, eBay has a buyers’ pro-
tection program for its community of registered
users. The program offers insurance for items it
lists for auction.
Proposition 6b: The greater the perception of
trust in a network, the more valuable that net-
work is likely to be to members and to the
provider(s).
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Figure 4. The role of structure, conduct, and basic conditions in network-related value creation and capture
In addition to reputation and trust, strong ties and
the threat of social sanctioning can also reduce
opportunism, thereby improving the value of a
network to users and providers (Uzzi, 1997; West-
phal and Khanna, 2003; Devers et al., 2009).
How? The close and frequent relations of strong
ties can enable members to learn more about
each other, thereby decreasing information asym-
metry. Close and frequent relationships can also
lead to an increase in the level of trust (Uzzi,
1997). Both a reduction in information asymme-
try and an increase in trust can decrease oppor-
tunistic behavior (Uzzi, 1997). Social sanction-
ing occurs when members of a network ostra-
cize or distance themselves from a member that
does not conform to the norms and values of
the network (Westphal and Khanna, 2003; Dev-
ers et al., 2009). The threat of sanctioning can be
enough to prevent some members from opportunis-
tic behavior.
BASIC CONDITIONS
The nature of the transactions carried out in a
network and the environment in which they are
pursued also play important roles in network-
related value creation and capture. These two fac-
tors have a direct effect on network structure and
conduct, and a moderating effect on the influence
of structure and conduct on value creation and cap-
ture (Figure 4).
Nature of transactions as antecedent and
moderator
One of the key distinguishing factors between net-
works is the nature of the transactions that each
network is used for. A cell phone network, used
for communications, is different from a credit card
network used to mediate between cardholders and
merchants. These differences often imply differ-
ences in infrastructures, feasibility of transactions,
distinctive capabilities, levels of trust, structural
holes, and other constructs. Consider the exam-
ple of an investment bank’s network of initial
public offering (IPO)-seeking start-ups and poten-
tial investors, versus a cell phone network. In
the former network, the investment bank mediates
between investors who want to buy stocks and the
start-ups that want to issue the stocks—a two-
sided network (Pollock et al., 2004; Parker and
Van Alstyne, 2005). In a cell phone network, the
provider enables each customer to make or receive
calls from any other customer—a one-sided net-
work. These two networks, designed for very dif-
ferent transactions, also have different structures,
suggesting that the nature of the transactions for
which a network is earmarked has a direct effect
on its structure.
To see the moderating effect of the nature of
transactions, consider trust, a conduct construct.
In an investment bank’s network of IPO-seeking
start-ups and potential investors, each firm’s stock
is an experience good to potential investors since
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it is difficult to tell, at purchase, if the stock will
perform well. Besides, the potential payoff—both
positive and negative—can be very high. There-
fore, potential investors need to be able to trust
either the investment bank or the start-up since
they have the information advantage. Contrast
this with a cell phone network where a lot less
trust is needed to make or receive a phone call.
Effectively, the nature of transactions moderates
the relationship between trust and the value of
a network to members and the provider. Similar
arguments can be made about the nature of the
transactions that determine the other structure and
conduct constructs, and the moderating effect on
their impact on value.
Environment
The other basic condition is the environment
in which networks operate—in particular, the
macro-environment made up of the political, eco-
nomic, social/demographic, technological, and nat-
ural (PESTN) environments (Afuah, 2009). To
keep the discussion tractable, I will focus on the
technological component of PESTN. From the
introduction of the telephone network, whose study
gave birth to the expression network externalities
(Rohlfs, 1974) to the birth of the Internet and cell
phones, new technologies have played a key role
in the value that network members and providers
derive from a network (Shapiro and Varian, 1999).
Consider, for example, a technological discontinu-
ity in which different technologies, each backed
by a different network of firms, are vying for the
standard or dominant design. Because they may
possess distinctive capabilities for exploiting the
technology or have been endowed with some other
asset, some firms are likely to be centrally located
relative to the other members of their networks
(Khazam and Mowery, 1994). For two reasons,
such centrally located firms are more likely to
have a strong influence on the process of stan-
dardization or emergence of a dominant design
than other members of their networks. First, since
centrally located firms have been associated with
better innovation performance (Sparrowe et al.,
2001; Gilsing et al., 2008; Soh, 2010), they may be
able to generate the types of ideas or products that
would foster better ties, build trust, reduce oppor-
tunism and so on, making their network better
suited for value creation and capture than compet-
ing ones. Second, centrally located firms can use
their positions to convince more network mem-
bers to support a particular design or standard.
Additionally, the fact that there are different tech-
nologies and their networks of backers competing
for a standard or dominant design means there are
likely to be structural holes between these net-
works. Gatekeepers and boundary scanners have
an opportunity to bridge these holes, given their
ability to act as transducers between such net-
works (Fleming and Waguespack, 2007; Allen,
1984). Effectively, the technological environment
has both a direct and moderating effect on structure
and conduct constructs.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The value that users derive from many products
depends not only on the product’s customer bene-
fits but also on its network of users. Past research
has established that network size is a primary
determinant of value from a network. The goal of
this paper is to show that factors beyond network
size determine the value of a network to its mem-
bers and provider(s). Starting with the neoclassical
economic assumptions that underpin past network
effects research, I showed that, in the context of
these rather ideal conditions, the value of a net-
work of size N to its members or its provider is
proportional to N2 –N. I called this relationship the
size hypothesis. By relaxing these assumptions to
better reflect the conditions that prevail in many
network industries, I argued that the structure of
a network and the conduct of its members are
important determinants of the value that members
and network providers derive from that network. In
particular, I argued that the value of a network will
be determined in part by the feasibility of transac-
tions in a network, the centrality of its members,
the structural holes and ties within the network,
the roles that each member can play, as well as
the opportunistic behavior, reputation, and percep-
tions of trust. These constructs are moderated by
some basic conditions (Figure 4). Table 1 summa-
rizes the relevant propositions and some potential
strategic implications for a network provider.
Strategic implications
There are important strategic implications from the
suggestion that a network’s structure and conduct
have an impact on the value a network member or
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provider can create or capture. I consider two of
these implications: more focus on factors beyond
size, and timing.
Focus on more than size
The first and most obvious strategic implication
is that structural factors and conduct factors play
important roles in shaping network value and
are therefore important drivers of strategic action
throughout the life of a network. Since these strate-
gic implications are summarized in Table 1, I will
discuss only three of them here. First, if members
who are centrally located or who bridge structural
holes add more value to a network (Propositions
1c), network providers might be wise to pursue
such members first. That is, rather than go after
just any member for the sake of increasing the size
of the network, as suggested by the size hypothe-
sis, a network provider may want to target those
non-opportunistic members who are likely to be
centrally located or form nonredundant bridges to
structural holes. The risk is that if such actors are
opportunistic, they may become handicaps rather
than enablers of value creation and capture.
Second, because networks are more valuable
when each member plays more than one role
(Proposition 3), network providers may want to
pursue activities that initially attract members who
play more than one role in the network. Build-
ing a network with such members may ultimately
make the network more valuable and more attrac-
tive to potential members than a network built on
size alone. eBay offers a good example. When
the company started out, its network of regis-
tered users was largely made up of individuals
who wanted to sell and buy collectibles—a so-
called consumer-to-consumer network. The net-
work eventually evolved to include business-to-
consumer activities.
Third, since high levels of opportunism in a
network can reduce the network’s value to mem-
bers (Proposition 5), a primary goal should be to
build one that has little or no opportunism. To the
extent that reputation effects and trust (Proposi-
tion 6) reduce the level of opportunism, network
providers may want to pursue activities that estab-
lish an early lead in members with a reputation for
honesty, trustworthiness, dependability, and retali-
ation. An initial lead in size for an auction network
is of little use to each member if the network is
full of opportunistic behavior. In fact, the larger an
opportunistic network, the less valuable the net-
work may become to each user. eBay again serves
as a good example. It moved early to establish a
rating system to curb both adverse selection and
moral-hazard-based opportunism.
Timing
Then there is the question of timing. In the neo-
classical world of the size hypothesis, most of
the jostling for size supremacy takes place before
the critical size, Nc, has been reached. Firms use
a product’s benefits to customers, pricing moves,
alliances, and other measures to secure an early
lead because, beyond Nc, such a lead becomes
difficult to overcome (without riding a new tech-
nological trajectory or another discontinuity). In
the world beyond the size hypothesis, competition
for leadership can continue throughout the life of
a network since many structural and conduct fea-
tures can still influence the value that customers
perceive in a network, regardless of network size.
Future directions for inquiry
To keep the core arguments of the paper tractable,
I limited exploration of the interaction between
structure and conduct constructs to just one: the
interaction between opportunism and network ties.
Since structure conditions conduct and vice versa,
exploring other structure-conduct interaction
effects could reveal some interesting insights. For
example, since reputation can spill over from a
more reputable network member to less reputable
ones (Kang, Mahoney, and Tan, 2009; Basdeo
et al., 2006; Stuart, 2000), future research could
look into the role that strong and weak ties play
in reputation spillovers. What type of ties are best
for which reputation signals and when?
Another area for further inquiry is the intersec-
tion between economics and sociology, which is
becoming more and more important to strategy the-
ory development. Networks are one of the few con-
texts for exploring the interplay of the RBV, the
PMP (market power view), and SNT. For exam-
ple, customers may be attracted to a firm’s network
because the network is large, because it has the
right mix of weak and strong ties, or because it has
structural holes that the customers could bridge. At
the same time, a large network may give a firm
enough market power to collect monopoly rents.
Thus, SNT constructs can be linked not only to
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Table 1. Beyond size: revisiting strategic implications
Construct Proposition Possible strategic




P1a: The more that each network member
can transact with every other member,
the more valuable the network is likely to
be to each member and to the network
provider(s).
Network infrastructure should
be built to maximize
possible transactions.
Centrality P1b: The more central a non-opportunistic
member’s position in a network, the more
valuable the member is likely to be to
other network members and the network
provider(s).




P1c: Members that bridge structural holes
in a network are more likely to create
and/or capture more value than members
that do not.
Span structural holes first, and
do so with non-opportunistic
members.
Network ties P2: The more that the ratio of
strong-to-weak ties matches that of
tacit-to-explicit knowledge, the more
valuable the network is likely to be for
network members and the network
provider(s).





P3: The more critical roles that each
network member plays, the more
valuable, on average, the network is
likely to be to each member and to the
network provider(s).
Build an early lead in the




P4a: A network is likely to be more
valuable to members and providers that
posses distinctive value-appropriating




example, in a two-sided
network, help or set price
lower for side whose
members have distinctive
resources.
P4b: The lower the scalability of a firm’s
resources for creating and/or capturing
value in a network, the more that a plot
of network value to the firm versus




P5: The more opportunistic behavior there
is in a network, the less valuable, on
average, the network is likely to be to
members and the network provider(s).






P6a: The higher the reputation of network
members for retaliation, honesty,
trustworthiness, and dependability, the
larger is the impact of network size on
network value to its members and to the
network provider(s).




Trust P6b: The greater the perception of trust in a
network, the more valuable that network
is likely to be to members.
Pursue activities that build trust
in the network.
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resources but also to drivers of market power.
It would be insightful to determine the extent
to which network effects are a strategic resource
rather than a PMP or vice versa, and how changes
to SNT constructs drive things in one direction
rather than another.
Perhaps one of the more interesting contexts in
which some of the propositions of this paper could
be empirically explored is the dotcom boom and
burst of the late 1990s and earlier 2000s. During
the boom, one of the few theory-grounded manage-
ment concepts used to support performance predic-
tions was network effects (Downes and Mui, 1997).
The primary argument then was deeply rooted in
the size hypothesis and went something like this:
because the Internet exhibits network effects, firms
that established an initial advantage in network
size would attract new customers more rapidly and
increase in size to a point where the provider of the
network would dominate its market, locking com-
petitors out (e.g, Downes and Mui, 1997). Future
empirical research could explore the extent to
which poor business models, a lack of complemen-
tary assets (Teece, 1986), or too much focus on size
and not enough attention to the constructs of this
paper was responsible for the bust of the dotcoms.
Finally, to keep the paper’s arguments tractable,
the discussion on the direct and moderating effects
of basic conditions on structure and conduct was
limited to two constructs and the technological
component of the PESTN environment. Future
research could explore the other constructs as well
as the political, economic, social/demographical
and natural components of PESTN.
CONCLUSION
To understand how competitive advantage is
attained and maintained in the increasingly com-
mon network industries of today’s economy, it is
important to understand the concept of network
effects. Moreover, network markets provide unique
contexts for drawing on the RBV, SNT, and PMP
theoretical perspectives to explore strategy phe-
nomena. Unfortunately, research about network
effects has not only been rooted in neoclassical
economics, it has also been largely about size. By
relaxing the assumptions that underpin the size
hypothesis and then drawing on other theoreti-
cal perspectives, we can better understand how
networks bestow value on network members and
enable network providers to create and/or capture
value. Drawing from areas outside of neoclassical
theory allows for the unraveling of more of the
secrets about the link between competitive advan-
tage and network effects. Size may not be every-
thing, after all.
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